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§7.1. Legislation-Admissibility of Evidence of S~ual Conduct 
of Victim in Sexual Assault and Rape Cases. Advoca~s of legislative 
and judicial reform in the treatment of sexual assault :and rape cases 
have often noted that the victim in a sexual assault ca~e is on trial as 
much as is the defendant.1 Chapter 110 of the Acts of 1977, approved 
April19, 1977 and effective immediately as an "emerg$tcy measure,"2 
suggests the impact of such comments upon the legislatUre. The stated 
purpose of the new statute is "to protect the victims of r~pe and certain 
other related crimes, "1 by sharply curtailing the scope of permissible 
inquiry into the victim's sexual character. The statut~ applies to all 
grand jury investigations and criminal proceedings in sexual assault and 
rape cases, and regulates four cat~gories of evidence: (1) evidence of 
specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct other than with the 
defendant, introduced to show consent or sexual character generally; (2) 
evidence of the victim's reputation for unchastity; (3) evidence of con-
duct "alleged to be the cause of any physical feature, characteristic, or 
condition of the victim;" and (4) "evidence of the victim's sexual con-
duct with the defendant. "4 
The statute prohibits admission of any evidence in the first two cate-
gories. 1 With respect to the first category-specific instances of sexual 
conduct other than with the defendant, introduced to show sexual char-
acter generally-the statutory prohibition merely restates existing case 
law, for Massachusetts courts have consistently held such evidence in-
• Robert Duahman ia an 8880Ciate in the Boston law ftrm of Brown, Rudnick, Freed & 
Geamer. 
§7.1. 1 See, e.g., Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Anafysis of Senate Bill 
1678, 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 1551, 1552 (1975); Landau, The Victim as Def~ndant, 10 Taw. 19 
(July/August 1974). · 
1 Acta of 1977, c. 110, adding G.L. c. 233, § 21B. 
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admissible upon the principle that "the victim's consent to intercourse 
with one man does not imply her consent in the case of another. "6 
With respect to the second category-evidence of the victim's general 
reputation for unchastity-the statutory prohibition changes existing 
law. Previously the rule was that such evidence is relevant and admissi-
ble.7 Thus, in one recent case the Supreme Judicial Court held such 
evidence to be so material on the issue of consent that its exclusion was 
prejudicial enor requiring reversal of a conviction for rape. 8 The Court 
in that case further held that the excluded evidence not only was mate-
rial to the issue of consent, but also cast doubt upon the credibility of 
the victim generally, to such an extent that its exclusion required rever-
sal of the defendant's convictions for assault and battery, sodomy, and 
unnatural and lascivious acts, which had been tried with the rape 
charge.• Thus, the new statutory exclusion of such evidence marks a 
noteworthy departure from prior law. 
With respect to the remaining two categories of evidence-specific 
instances of sexual conduct with the defendant and specific instances 
of sexual conduct to explain a physical feature, characteristic, or condi-
tion of the victim-the statute also departs from prior law. Generally, 
such evidence was admissible under prior case law. 10 Under the new 
statute such evidence is admissible only if the defendant makes "a 
written motion for admission of same and an offer of proof' and the 
court "after an in camera hearing" outside the presence of the jury 
concludes, in a written finding, "that the weight and relevancy of said 
evidence is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the victim 
... ; otherwise not." 11 
The statute's concern with "prejudice" to the victim deserves special 
attention. Generally, the concept of "prejudice" in a criminal case is 
associated with a party, usually the defendant. By applying the concept 
• See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gouveia, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2877, 2881, 358 N.E.2d 
1001, 1003. Cf. Commonwealth v. McKay, 363 Mass. 220, 224-27, 294 N.E. 2d 213, 217 
(1973) (holding admiSBible evidence that victim was a virgin prior to the offense). 
7 Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 MaSB. 605, 610-11, 328 N.E.2d 496, 499-500 (1975). 
While some authorities have suggested that admiBBibility of such evidence may have 
constitutional overtones, see FED. R. Evm. 404, Advisory Committee's Note (1973), cited 
in Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. at 614,328 N.E.2d at 501 (Braucher, J., dissent-
ing), there are as yet no cases specifically addressing the constitutionality of exclusion of 
such evidence. 
• 367 Mass. at 613, 328 N.E.2d at 500-01. 
I Jd. 
18 Massachusetts courts generally recite this rule as a matter of dictum, see, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. McKay, 363 MaBB. 220, 226,294 N.E.2d 213, 219 (1973); Commonwealth v. 
Gardner, 350 Mass. 664, 668, 216 N.E.2d 558, 561 (1966); Commonwealth v. Harris, 131 
Mass. 336, 336 (1881). Case law in other states supports this rule except where changed 
by statute; see generally Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364 (1942). 
II G.L. c. 233, §21B. 
2
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of "prejudice" to the victim in a sexual assault case, the legislature has 
implicitly voiced its agreement with the views of reform advocates that 
the victim in such cases is very much a party "on trial" who may have 
rights entitled to legislative protection. 12 
§7 .2. Admissibility of Deposition Against Party Joined After 
Deposition Was Taken. Rule 32(a) of the MassachusettS! Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows the deposition of an unavailable witness to be admit-
ted into evidence against "any party who was present or ~epresented at 
the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof."' During the 
Survey Year the Appeals Court examined, for the first t~me in Massa-
chusetts, the admissibility under that Rule of a deposition against a 
party who was not joined to the litigation until after the taking of the 
deposition. The case, Frizzell v. Wes Pine Millwork, Inc., 2 arose out of 
a collision between an automobile driven by Ryder and another automo-
bile owned by the defendant Wes Pine Millwork, Inc. iand driven by 
Madore. 3 The passengers of the Ryder vehicle brought six separate ac-
tions against Madore and Wes Pine Millwork.' 
All six actions were tried together, although there was apparently no 
formal order for consolidation and the cases had proceeded separately 
prior to trial. 5 In one of the six actions, brought by a pa11senger named 
Carfagna, the defendants took a deposition in Oakland, California of 
Ryder, who was apparently then living in Oakland.• Before taking that 
deposition, the defendants gave due notice to Carfagna and to the plain-
tiffs in the other actions, but at the deposition only the. deponent and 
an attorney for the defendants were in attendance.7 At:the joint trial, 
the defendants sought to introduce the Ryder deposition not only 
12 The fact remains, however, that there is a very real difference between the defendant 
and the victim in a sexual assault case. In particular, where evidence is both prejudicial 
to the victim and also material to the defense, the defendant's constitutional right to 
present such evidence may necessarily outweigh the victim's right to have it excluded. See 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); cf. Commonwealth v. Gouveia, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2877, 2882, 358 N.E. 2d 1001, 1004 (holding evidence of victim's sexual conduct with 
persons other than the defendant irrelevant and therefore properly excluded to protect the 
victim). Similarly, even though the balancing of prejudicial effect against materiality in 
other contexts is left to the trial court's broad discretion, the constitutional dimensions 
of the defendant's right to present evidence may require closer appellate control over the 
exercise of such discretion under this new statute. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284 (1973). 
§7.2. ' MAss. R. C1v. P. 32(a). 
2 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1243, 358 N.E.2d 447. 
• ld. at 1243, 358 N.E.2d at 450. 
• Id. 




Dushman: Chapter 7: Evidence
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
§7.2 EVIDENCE 133 
against Carfagna but also against the other plaintiffs, including Thomas 
Frizzell.8 Over Frizzell's objection, the trial court admitted the deposi-
tion without restriction, and the jury found for the defendants.' Frizzell 
appealed, claiming error in the admission of the deposition as against 
him. 
It being clear that Ryder was unavailable as a witness, the sole issue 
on appeal was whether Frizzell was a "party" against whom such a 
deposition may be admitted under Rule 32. 10 The Appeals Court held 
that Frizzell was not such a party and reversed the judgment against 
him. 11 The court rejected the argument, upon which the trial court had 
apparently relied, that the language of Rule 32(a), making such a depo-
sition admissible against "any party," necessarily included Frizzell, who 
was a party at the time of trial. 12 The court noted that nothing in the 
text of the Rule required such an interpretation. Moreover, the court 
stated that elsewhere in the Rules relating to depositions, the word 
"parties" was limited to those who were parties "as of the time of the 
deposition."13 Because the language of Rule 32 was not determinative, 
the Appeals Court looked beyond the language, to the justification for 
admission of deposition testimony, to fashion an appropriate definition 
of "party." As the Appeals Court viewed the Rule, "use [of a deposi-
tion] at trial is premised upon a prior right to cross-examine the depo-
nent."•• Since the only parties who have that right are parties at the 
time of the deposition, and since most other rights relating to deposition 
procedure are also limited to parties at the time of the deposition, 15 the 
court reasoned that such a limitation would similarly be appropriate in 
interpreting Rule 32(a)(3). Moreover, the court concluded that such a 
limitation would conform admissibility of depositions to the same rules 
of admissibility applicable to former testimony generally, since Massa-
chusetts courts allow such testimony to be admitted only against parties 
to the previous action or their privies. 18 
The Appeals Court also examined federal court decisions interpreting 
the Federal Rules corresponding to Massachusetts Rule 32(a)(3), since 
such precedents would be controlling in interpreting the Massachusetts 
Rules. 17 Like the Appeals Court, the federal courts have rejected the 
• /d. 
• /d. at 1243-44, 358 N .E.2d at 450-51. 
10 Id. at 1249, 358 N.E.2d at 454. 
II /d. 
12 Id. at 1245, 358 N .E.2d at 451. 
13 Id. at 1245-46, 358 N.E.2d at 451-52. 
•• /d. at 1245, 358 N.E.2d at 451. 
•• /d. at 1245-46, 358 N.E.2d at 451-52. But see MASs. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(2). 
•• See 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1249, 358 N.E.2d at 454, and cases cited therein. 
17 Id. at 1246, 358 N.E.2d at 452; see Rollins Environmental Inc. v. Superior Court, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2052, 2060, 330 N.E.2d 814, 821. MASs. R. C1v. P. 32 (a)(3) provides: 
4
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argument that depositions in the circumstanees of the Frizzell case are 
admissible against all who are parties as of the time of t:rial, and instead 
apply a more flexible test based upon the purposes and justification for 
the Rule.t8 However, unlike the Appeals Court, some of the federal 
courts have phrased that justification not solely in ter~s of the adverse 
party's right to cross-examine the deponent, but more proadly in terms 
of whether "the deposition is taken under adversarial circumstances. "•• 
As authority for this broader formulation, the federal courts have cited 
Wigmore, 20 whose position is extremely liberal in favor Qf admitting such 
hearsay. Wigmore has advocated dispensing with the common law re-
quirement that the party against whom the testimony is admitted must 
have been a party to the prior action, asserting in"tead that it is 
"sufficient to inquire whether the former testimony wasi given upon such 
an issue that the party-opponent in that case had the s~me interest and 
motive in his cross-examination that the present opponent has."21 Wig-
more has also stated the issue in terms of whether a thorough and 
adequate cross-examination has been had.22 His reasoning is that 
"where the interest of the person was calculated to induce equally as 
thorough a testing by cross-examination, then the presEtnt opponent has 
had adequate protection for the same end."23 Thus, the federal courts, 
At trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or 
all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though 
the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who 
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice 
thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions: 
(3) the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party 
for any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the 
witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or 
is out of the United States, unless it appears that the absence df the witness was 
procured by the party offering the deposition; or (C) that the witness is unable to 
attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (0) that 
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the 
witness by subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional 
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due 
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open 
court, to allow the deposition to be used. 
•• See, e.g., Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197,205-06 (7th Cir. 1970);Fullerform Continu-
ous Pipe Corp. v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 44 F.R.D. 453, 456 (D. Ariz.' 1968); 
Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 20·23 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961); 
Rivera v. American Export Lines, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 27, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
11 Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 205 (7th Cir. 1970). 
" 5 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 1388 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 
WIGMORE). 
21 Id. See Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
929 (1961). 
12 WIGMORE, supra note 20, §1338. 
28 /d. 
5
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following Wigmore's analysis, have not insisted upon strict adherence 
to the common law rules of admissibility and have allowed in evidence 
depositions which would be inadmissible under the strict common law 
rules.24 
After discussing all of the foregoing formulations the Appeals Court 
concluded that it was not necessary to decide which of them to adopt, 
for the court determined that the deposition of Ryder would be inadmis-
sible in the circumstances of the case under any test. Because neither 
Carfagna nor any of the other plaintiffs cross-examined, or even ap-
peared, at the Ryder deposition, that deposition failed the test of 
"whether a thorough and adequate cross-examination has been had."25 
For the same reasons, the deposition was not "taken under adversarial 
circumstances." Nor in fact, did the circumstances of the Ryder deposi-
tion meet the most liberal test-that there be an opportunity for cross-
examination by a party with the same interest and motive as the party 
against whom it was offered; for although Carfagna may have had an 
opportunity to cross-examine Ryder, there was no basis for determining 
that his interest and motive coincided with Frizzell's inasmuch as Car-
fagna did not even appear at the deposition. As the Appeals Court 
pointed out, "Carfagna's decision not to participate in California may 
have been based upon considerations (e.g. the amount at stake, Car-
fagna's financial condition, access to California counsel) quite different 
from those which might have motivated Frizzell."28 Accordingly, even 
if the court were inclined to require a litigant to rely upon another 
party's cross-examination, it refused to "bind a litigant to the decision 
of such party not to attend at all. "27 
Although it was thus unnecessary for the Appeals Court to decide 
which rule of admissibility to adopt or what the result would have been 
if Carfagna had in fact cross-examined, or at least appeared, at Ryder's 
deposition, the court's opinion does give some guidance as to the proper 
procedure to be followed under more difficult fact situations. For exam-
ple, if Carfagna's action had been consolidated with Frizzell's before, 
rather than at, trial, the Appeals Court's opinion suggests the defen-
dants could have secured permission to use the deposition if they had 
applied to the trial court for such permission sufficiently in advance of 
trial to enable Frizzell to depose Ryder himself, assuming Ryder's avail-
ability for such deposition. This procedure prevails in the federal 
24 See, e.g., Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Hertz v. Graham, 23 
F.R.D. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961); Rivera v. American 
Export Lines, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
21 1976 MaBB. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1248, 358 N.E.2d at 453. 
21 /d. at 1247, 358 N.E.2d at 453. 
21 Id. 
6
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courts, 28 and also would satisfy the Appeals Court's concern with "a 
prior right to cross-examine the deponent." Moreover, there is little 
justification for a contrary rule forbidding use of such a deposition, for 
such a prohibition would merely require the proponent of the deposition 
to renotice the deposition, repeat his previous examination, and pre-
sumably receive the same answers, a waste of both time and expense. 
A more difficult problem arises if the proponent of the deposition does 
not give adequate pre-trial notice of his intention to use the deposition, 
or if there is adequate notice but the deponent is then unavailable for 
re-examination. The language of some of the federal cases suggests that 
such depositions would be admissible so long as at least one party to the 
deposition had an opportunity for cross-examination with the same mo-
tive and interest as the party against whom the deposition is offered at 
trial. 29 However, an examination of the facts of those cases demonstrates 
that in nearly all of them the party against whom the deposition was 
offered at trial was in fact represented at the deposition or had the 
opportunity to conduct his own pre-trial examination because of ade-
quate pre-trial notice.30 Moreover, because the language of the most 
liberal federal cases comes from Wigmore's description of rules relating 
to former testimony generally, 31 their reasoning is questionable now that 
both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
have expressly rejected Wigmore's formulation, and limit the use of such 
testimony to actual parties to the prior proceeding or sudcessors in inter-
21 See, e.g., Fullerform Continuous Pipe Corp. v. American Pipe and Constr. Co. 44 
F.R.D. 453 (D. Ariz. 1968). 
21 See Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 
(1961); Rivera v. American Export Lines, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
31 See Fullerform Continuous Pipe Corp. v. American Pipe and Constr. Co., 44 F.R.D. 
453, 454 (D. Ariz. 1968); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 929 (1961). The only exception, where a deposition was admitted against a party 
who was not a party at the time of the deposition, is Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 200 
(7th Cir. 1970). The facts of that case are exceptional. Of the two plaintiffs, only one was 
a party at the time the defendant took depositions of two witnesses, and only that plain-
tiffs attorney appeared at the depositions. However, that same attorney also assumed 
"almost complete charge of both cases from the standpoint of the presentation of the 
plaintiffs' evidence and the cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses" at trial. ld. 
at 206. Thus, because the plaintiff who was not a party to the deposition relied almost 
completely upon his co-plaintiffs attorney's examination and cross-examination at trial, 
he could not very well complain of being forced to rely upon that same attorney's examina-
tion at the deposition as well. In the more usual case, where each party's attorney conducts 
his own trial examination, there would be more force to the argument! that a party should 
not be compelled to rely upon a co-party's deposition examination, but should have the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness himself. See Falknor, Former Testimony and the 
Uniform Rules: A Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 651, 655 (1963). 
31 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 1388. 
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est.32 Therefore, unless the federal courts find a justification for admit-
ting deposition testimony in broader circumstances than former testi-
mony generally, it is likely that in future cases they will retreat from 
Wigmore's formulations with respect to depositions as well. If so, then 
Massachusetts courts, whose rules relating to former testimony are at 
least as restrictive as the federal rules, 33 should similarly limit use of 
depositions. 
In light of these developments, if a party seeks to use a deposition 
against an opponent who was not a party to the deposition, the safest 
course is to apply as early as possible to the court for leave to introduce 
the deposition; and the court should allow the request if there is time 
and opportunity for the opponent to examine the deponent prior to trial. 
Otherwise, there is a good chance the deposition will not be admissible. 
§7.3. Photographs of Homicide Victims-Abuse of Discretion 
Where Gruesome Injuries Are Not Attributable to Defendant. One 
of the recurring issues in homicide cases is the admissibility of post-
mortem photographs of the victim's body to illustrate the nature and 
extent of the fatal injuries. The universal rule in such cases is that such 
photographs are admissible where the cause or manner of death is a 
material issue in the case, unless the photographs are "so inflammatory 
... as to outweigh [their] probative value,"1 a determination left al-
most exclusively to the sound discretion of the trial court.2 
Shortly before the Survey year began, the Supreme Judicial Court 
reaffirmed the almost limitless breadth of the trial court's discretion in 
such matters, and further observed: 
Counsel have cited no case which this court has held that it is error 
to admit photographs or slides of the victim's body in the trial of 
an indictment charging an unlawful homicide by violence. On at 
least two occasions we have commented on the paucity, and per-
haps the absence, of any such holding by this court. . . . Neverthe-
less, undaunted by our repeated holdings that such evidence was 
properly admitted, defendants, or perhaps more correctly their 
counsel, continue to press appeals on this now well settled issue. 
Perhaps this persistence is encouraged by our frequent suggestions 
that the admissibility of such evidence is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge. If, indeed, the admissibility of 
such evidence depends to any extent on the exercise of judicial 
32 FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(l); 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1248 n.2, 358 N.E.2d at 453 
n.2. 
,. 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1249, 358 N.E.2d at 454, and cases cited therein. 
§7.3. 1 Commonwealth v. Richmond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2873, 2874-75, 358 N.E.2d 
999-1000. 
2 Commonwealth v. Bys, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1358, 1372-74, 348 N.E.2d 431, 432. 8
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discretion, it is obvious that the defendant who claims an abuse 
of that discretion assumes a heavy burden. 3 
In Commonwealth v. Richmond, 4 only seven months after writing the 
opinion quoted above, the Supreme Judicial Court finally rewarded one 
such defendant's persistence by holding, apparently for the first time 
ever in Massachusetts, that the trial court's admission; of post-mortem 
photographs was an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of the defen-
dant's conviction of first degree murder. 
There was evidence in Richmond that the defendant raped and mur-
dered the victim on January 11, 1975 and left her nud~ body in a snow 
bank.5 Before discovery of the body on January 16, 1975 dogs had at-
tacked the body and severely mutilated the victim's face.• Photographs 
of the victim which were taken subsequently showed tpe effects of this 
mutilation. 7 Over the defendant's objection and exception, the trial 
court admitted the photographs into evidence. On the; defendant's ap-
peal, the Supreme Judicial Court viewed the photographs and unani-
mously reversed the defendant's conviction, holding t~at admission of 
the photographs was prejudicial error.8 
The Court was careful to emphasize the extraordinary circumstances 
of the case, including the gruesome nature of the injuries which the dogs 
caused and the impossibility of the jury's separating those injuries from 
those which the defendant caused.' Nevertheless, de$pite the Court's 
disclaimers, the fact remains that there is now at least one precedent 
for excluding photographs of the victim's body. 
• ld. at 1373-74, 348 N.E.2d at 433. 
4 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2873, 358 N.E.2d 999. 
' ld. at 2873-74, 358 N.E.2d 999-1000 . 
• ld. 
7 ld. 
• ld. at 2876, 358 N.E.2d at 1002. 
' ld. Significantly, the Court noted that "the Commonwealth had a very strong case, 
and with the testimony of the pathologist, [it] would not have been harmed had the 
pictures of the injuries to the victim after death not been exhibited to the jury as they 
were." ld. 
9
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